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TERROR ISM, PUN ISHMENT, AND RECOGN ITION
Henrique Carvalho*
This paper discusses some theoretical and practical challenges that terrorism poses
to a normative theory of punishment, using a theory of recognition as the main
basis for critique. Punishment exists in constant tension with principles such as
individual autonomy and human dignity, which the contemporary legal frame-
work strives to uphold. The limits of this tension are both defined and challenged
by situations of radical deviance, of which the current paradigmatic case is
terrorism. Theorists such as Antony Duff who attempt to define punishment as
a communicative endeavor, and thus justified in the eyes of a liberal political
community, find a hard case in the figure of the terrorist. But such an analysis
misses an important point in relation to the social nature of autonomy, and such
absence risks jeopardizing the whole communicative process that punishment
presumably preserves. From the perspective of recognition, this paper aims to re-
flect upon the criminalization of the terrorist in a way that not only criticizes it,
but also puts the aforementioned justification of punishment into question.
Keywords: Duff, recognition, terrorism, communication, punishment,
dialectics
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Man is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recognition. This necessity
is his own, not that of our thinking in contrast to the content. As recognizing,
man is himself the movement [of recognition], and this movement itself is
what negates (hebt auf ) his natural state: he is recognition.1
There seems to be a paradox between the pragmatic framework of the
institution of punishment and any theory that attempts to justify it. There
are strong grounds to agree with Antony Duff that “[t]errorism poses a sig-
nificant challenge to a liberal account of punishment that emphasizes its
communicative character and that seeks to reconcile punishment with a
proper recognition of our fellow citizenship with those whom we pun-
ish.”2 After all, the figure of the terrorist itself stands as something of a
conceptually open term to legal and social theory; when a liberal legal sys-
tem tries to fit a real person into such a complex category, it finds it hard
to develop a theoretical justification that still upholds principles of respon-
sibility and individual autonomy.
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the debate regarding the proper
limits of the criminal law and the justification of a system of punishment, fo-
cusing on how to or whether to criminalize the terrorist, through a critique of
the work of Antony Duff. In his article “Notes on Punishment and Terror-
ism,” Duff engages with just such a problem, and the opening phrase of the
text, quoted above, delineates with clarity the way in which he attempts to
provide a pathway to a solution. The precise question he asks is “whether
we should see terrorists as criminals . . . , or as enemy combatants . . . , or as
‘unlawful combatants.’”3 The perspective he chooses to answer it is that of a
normative theory of punishment (evidenced by the fact that he asks the ques-
tion of how we should see terrorists, not how we do see them) based on liberal
assumptions, but with a particular emphasis on its communicative character.
Focusing on the possibility to “reconcile punishment with a proper recogni-
tion of our fellow citizenship with those whom we punish,”4 this liberal com-
munitarian theory sees punishment as an instrument of recognition. The
specific relation between these concepts is arguably the key not only to
understand the challenge that terrorism poses to such a theory, but also to
. G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A translation of the Jena Lectures on
the Philosophy of Spirit (–) with commentary  ().
. R.A. Duff, Notes on Punishment and Terrorism,  Am Behav. Scientist  ().
. Id.
. Id.
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understand why the reflections that Duff offers can be seen as problematic in
themselves.
Thus, two main issues are evidenced in Duff ’s discussion of terrorism,
and constitute the focus of this paper. The first comprises the tensions in a
theory of punishment that tries to reconcile punishment with communica-
tion through an account of the liberal claims that surround responsibility
and individuality. To confront this problem, the paper will delineate as-
pects of Duff ’s theory and examine its assumptions in Part I. Then, once
the core of these tensions are linked with the notion of recognition, Part II
of the paper will sketch a theory of recognition based on a discussion of
Hegelian dialectics.5 Such a critical perspective on responsibility and pun-
ishment can, one hopes, elucidate problems found in liberal legal theory.
The second issue relates more specifically to Duff ’s initial claim, that
terrorism poses a challenge to a communicative theory of punishment.
Part III will address this issue through the particular perspective developed
in the previous sections. It will propose that, more than terrorism posing a
threat to such an account of communicative normativity, serious examina-
tion of the liberal assumptions behind responsibility and respect for the in-
dividual can pose a challenge to the concepts of terrorism and punishment
as established within contemporary theory.
I . PUN ISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND RECOGNITION
This section will consider Duff ’s account of punishment as a communica-
tive endeavour, and relate questions in his notion of communication to
the underlying issue of recognition. Duff ’s argument about punishment
in “Penance, Punishment and the Limits of Community,”6 in a nutshell,
is that “we should understand criminal punishment as, ideally, a kind of
secular penance.”7 Although traditional theories regarding the justification
of punishment have firmly stated that the criminal law should refrain from
inquiring too deeply into the subject’s guilt or conscience, separating
. Although this paper focuses on specific aspects of Hegel’s work, there are different
emphases on Hegelian scholarship, some more rationalizing, some more critical. See, e.g.,
Alan Brudner, Punishment and Freedom ().
. R.A. Duff, Penance, Punishment and the Limits of Community,  Punishment &
Soc’y – ().
. Id. at .
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harmful or offensive conduct from inner motives, there has recently been a
series of theories that aim to produce a thicker account of punishment,
among which is “the idea that punishment should involve such elements
as repentance and atonement.”8 The notion of penance is taken from
religious contexts, in which it constitutes “something necessarily painful
or burdensome that is required of or undertaken by the sinner because of
a sin,” or in other words, “a punishment for that sin.”9 It has many pur-
poses, among which is the induction of a repentant understanding of the
sin and the communication of that repentance to the wronged party, not
particularly as a way of evidencing it but more as an essential part of such
repentance, that is, “a way of taking the matter seriously.”10 “Penance,”
says Duff, “thus looks both backward, to the sin for which it is undertaken,
and forward, to the restoration of the sinner’s relationships with those
whom she wronged”11; this goes hand in hand with Duff ’s intent to find
a middle-ground between retributivist (backward-looking) and consequen-
tialist (forward-looking) perspectives on punishment.12 In both instances, he
claims penance shows itself as intrinsically inclusionary, as it portrays the
sinner as a member of a community, who violated its values and, through
the act of penance, can repair the relationship with the community that the
wrongful acts have damaged.13
The idea of punishment as secular penance, then, characterizes it as
“a communicative process between the offender and the polity,” a way in
which “to make moral reparation for the wrong that was done.”14 It pursues
multiple aims: communicating the deserved censure to the offender; making
them recognize the wrong for which they need to make moral reparation;
bringing them to make such reparation, which also constitutes a form of force-
ful apology; and finally, through this process, reconciling them with the com-
munity. It is even a reformative enterprise, as in the offender’s recognition of
their wrong, he would also “recognize the need to reformhis future conduct.”15
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id.
. For more on this see R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community
(); R.A. Duff & David Garland, A Reader on Punishment ().
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at –.
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Although Duff does not go into detail about the communicative char-
acter of his theory or about his precise notion of community in the article
presently under analysis (such details can mainly be found in his book
Punishment, Communication, and Community,16 and will be scrutinized
later in this paper), he engages with a series of criticisms he expects to be
directed by liberals against penance playing a proper role in a system of
state punishment. This engagement is very illuminating in regard to the
particular way in which he envisages that a system of punishment would
address its subjects. He anticipates it might be argued that, as previously
suggested, penance not only addresses the offender’s conduct, but their
moral attitudes in a deeper sense. Such invasion of the individual sphere
can be accepted within a religious community, but not as a general exigency,
for the following reasons: First, members of a religious community are free to
leave it if they so choose, whereas citizens cannot separate themselves from
the State. Second, because the sinner is a voluntary member of the commu-
nity, they have chosen to submit themselves to its values, whereas a citizen
does not have to accept all the values of their political community. Third, the
confession involved in penance itself is voluntary, whereas punishment can-
not be conditional on voluntary confession. And fourth, the sinner is still able
to refuse to undertake the penance—at risk of excommunication or other
kind of exclusion from community—whereas punishment is not and could
not be optional.17
Duff addresses these potential objections in an explanation divided into
three parts. First he claims that, whereas penitential punishment “seeks to
engage [the offenders’] moral attitudes and feelings, it does not (it should
not) seek to coerce those attitudes and feelings”; instead, “it aims to per-
suade, rather than to coerce, their moral understanding”18; it is, as he puts
it, “an exercise in forceful moral communication.”19 Second, “criminal
punishment need not and should not be as ambitious as religious punish-
ment”20; the criminal law focuses instead “on the wrongfulness of the
criminal deed, on the wrongful attitudes or concerns directly manifested
. R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community ().
. Duff, supra note , at –.
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id. at .
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in that deed,”21 and does not need to reach as deep as religious punish-
ment, aimed to affect the soul of the offender and thus going over the
border set by liberal conceptions of privacy. Third, finally, Duff argues
that the expectation that the state “show its citizens the respect due to
them as responsible moral agents” leads to the conclusion that the state
“must address them in the kind of moral language that is central to this
account of punishment.”22 Thus, the criminal law should be ready to ex-
pose the wrongfulness involved in crime, and to censure this wrongfulness
in a way that allows citizens to recognize it and repent. More than a prac-
tical suggestion, communicative punishment would be a requirement;
a “communicative system of punishment,” Duff argues, “is what we are
owed.”23
To try and understand the weight of Duff ’s tripartite defense of his
theory of punishment, it would be useful to examine his three claims
in the inverse order in which they were presented. To begin, then, within
the claim that a communicative system of punishment is owed to citi-
zens lies the assumption that the state ought to respect its citizens as
responsible moral agents. Particular conceptions of responsibility and
agency come thus to the fore, embedded within liberal philosophy in prin-
ciples such as individual autonomy, rationality, and self-determination.24
Duff has long struggled with the attempt to find a compromise between
individualist requirements for agency and rationality in the criminal
law, and communitarian notions of moral contingency in responsibility,
suggesting such compromise can be found in the idea of the citizen as a
moral agent bound by the community of the state.25 Since Duff ’s concep-
tion of citizenship sees the citizen necessarily as a moral agent, Duff sees
individual autonomy and freedom not only as rational requirements, but
also as values shared and sustained by a liberal community.26
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. A more detailed discussion of the connection between these principles and the idea
of responsible agency can be found in Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (), and
Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law ().
. See, e.g., Duff, supra note , ch. ; R.A. Duff, Answering for Crime, ch.  ();
Alan Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice, ch.  ().
. Duff, supra note , at .
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So, if punishment seeks to recognize the citizen as a moral agent, that is,
to be consistent with what Duff calls a “liberal political community,”27 it
has to be communicative. In Punishment, Communication, and Community,
Duff argues against the idea of an “expressive” purpose in punishment, and
for “its communicative purpose: for communication involves, as expres-
sion need not, a reciprocal and rational engagement.”28 So, communica-
tion “aims to engage that person as an active participant in the process
who will receive and respond to the communication, and it appeals to
the other’s reason and understanding.”29 From what this short descrip-
tion of communication indicates, it seems that Duff ’s normative concep-
tion of punishment would indeed be very different from actual systems,
and one could even go further and wonder whether the two would be at
all compatible.
Second, the critical edge enunciated by the first claim does not stand
alone; it is followed by the claim that the criminal law should focus on the
“wrongfulness” of the offender’s deed.30 To think in terms of wrongfulness
without deeply qualifying it is, before anything, to imply a specific and pre-
vious moral judgment concerning the attitude of the offender, dependent
on the shared values implied by his conception of community. The way in
which the wrongful nature of the conduct is defined carries the weight of
Duff ’s communitarian perspective on punishment, for the criminal law is
interested in “public” wrongs, which are to be understood as “wrongs in
which ‘the public,’ the community as a whole, is properly interested”31;
such public interest would be assessed and reflected by the state, through its
democratic structures, and fed into the system of punishment.
Third, finally, upon determining such wrongfulness and identifying it
in the offender’s conduct, the system would then engage in forceful moral
communication. Duff ’s connotation of this idea is that, although punish-
ment is to be imposed on offenders against their will, it should be aimed
at persuading, rather than coercing, their moral understanding. It must
provide a clear moral message to the offender, and in Duff ’s words, “We
can try to force them to hear the message that their punishment aims to
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id.
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Duff, supra note , at .
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convey: but we must not try to force them to accept it—or even to listen
to it or to take it seriously.”32
Despite the image of nonauthoritarian communication presented here,
there is no doubt that the two poles of the communicative relation are
not symmetrical. In Punishment, Communication, and Community, Duff
claims that one aspect of communication is that it also seeks “to affect fu-
ture conduct” by declaring some kinds of conduct as wrong in order “to
persuade citizens (those who need persuading) to refrain from such con-
duct.”33 Suddenly the earlier reciprocal aspect of communication seems to
lose focus in favor of a more pragmatic notion of persuasion. Although the
idea of persuasion can be nuanced in ethical, practical, and strategic ways,
Duff is clear that the law aims at persuading the citizen to refrain from
some conduct. The idea here is not to engage with the criminal in recip-
rocal dialogue; it is to convince them of the wrongfulness of their actions.
Dialogue has a limited, one-way quality, and the “communicative” aspect
is merely a means to achieve persuasion; it aims “to bring citizens to rec-
ognize and to accept”34 the wrongfulness of their conduct, but says noth-
ing of recognizing any of the citizen’s claims in return. If the law identifies
any “direct manifestation” of “attitudes or concerns” that fit preestablished
moral considerations, the citizen’s position is taken to be “wrongful.”35
What comes out of this framework is that the offender is forcefully exposed
to a moral message that they are deemed to be able to understand and to
accept—and even though they are not forced to do either, the legal system
ignores any argument to the contrary of its predetermined moral judgment.
The justification for that is that the wrongfulness is public—that is, it repre-
sents the community’s (including here the offender’s) interests—and even if
the law is basically saying to the offender “you are wrong, whether you accept
it or not,” the process is deemed reciprocal. But such a formal recognition of
the autonomy of the offender does not seem to fit into Duff ’s previously bold
and rather substantial enunciation of what communication entails—“a recip-
rocal and rational engagement” of the agent “as an active participant in the
process who will receive and respond to the communication”36; it would
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Duff, supra note , at .
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be better understood as the previously eschewed notion of expressive
punishment or, even worse (because it aims to persuade), as forced accep-
tance or imposition, which is not far short of indoctrination. The offender’s
options are reduced either to consent with the discourse contained within
the criminal law or to remain silent, to submit; the pre-judgment contained
in the wrongfulness of their actions already predetermines what they may be
allowed to say, should they choose to “communicate.” Such an authoritative
notion of communication can hardly be said to be reciprocal.
If Duff is right that we—as members of the political community—are
owed a communicative engagement on the part of the legal system, the
core of the matter, then, becomes the question, can his normative theory
of punishment be up to the task of doing justice to the assumptions within
his own conception of the liberal legal principles? Not only that, if this
claim is to be taken seriously, can any system of punishment achieve this
level of communication with the offender? That is, can it recognize those
it aims to punish as responsible moral agents and engage with them in
reciprocal dialogue, instead of merely forcing them to unidirectionally
accept the system’s rules?
Punishment seems to derive its justification from its backward-looking
relation to the crime and its forward-looking relation to the preservation of
community bonds; both relations seem to be dependent on some notion
of communication, which is in itself dependent on one’s conception of
political community. The communicative engagement, by its turn, aims
at recognizing the subject as a responsible moral agent. If Duff ’s theory
“seeks to reconcile punishment with a proper recognition of our fellow
citizenship with those whom we punish,”37 such recognition seems to
ground responsible moral agency, and thus deserves special attention from
a critical examination of the framework in which punishment operates.
Recognition is arguably the key to understanding the problematic relation-
ship between punishment and communication.
I I . THE NATURE OF RECOGNITION
If we are going to take the idea of recognition seriously, there is no better
way to start than with Hegel, whose work in the topic has retained its
. Duff, supra note .
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significance in contemporary social theory. The quote at the start of this
paper refers to Hegel’s Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit,38 the most
comprehensive of his texts on recognition, developed right before his work
on the Phenomenology of Spirit.39 Hegel’s account of recognition is one of
the greatest modern influences on the idea of mutual interdependence in
society and on communitarian challenges to atomistic notions of individ-
uality.40 From the quote it is possible to highlight the idea of solidarity, as
“[m]an is necessarily recognized and necessarily gives recognition,”41 and
the idea that recognition—as a constituent of human agency—is intrinsic
to human being: “This necessity is his own . . . man . . . is recognition.”42
Taking these two initial thoughts into account, this section will first look
into a discussion of recognition from Duff ’s perspective on the term. It
will then move on to consider how recognition is linked with punishment
in Hegel’s political philosophy, before delving into a deeper reflection on
the concept through Axel Honneth’s comment on Hegel’s early critique of
the social contract43 and Hegel’s account of “Independence and Depen-
dence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage”44 in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit, along with Alexandre Kojève’s own interpretation of it.45
In Punishment, Communication, and Community, Duff talks about “the
‘recognition’ of fellowship . . . in a political community,”46 contrasting
this idea with the liberal individualist conception of choice, which empha-
sizes the volitional character of choosing what to believe, what values and
principles to accept. Duff sees recognition as “basic to moral life and
thought” as “[w]e must attend to the world and to other people as sources
of moral demands on us . . . and we must recognize others as our fel-
lows.”47 The emphasis in this perspective is precisely that such bonds,
such recognition of fellowship, is “given in moral experience,”48 some-
thing that can be rationally questioned but cannot be denied or set
. Hegel, supra note .
. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit ().
. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self ().
. Hegel, supra note .
. Id.
. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition ().
. Hegel, supra note , at –.
. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel – ().
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Id.
. Id.
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aside: “I might not be required by either psychology or logic to accept
these bonds . . . but I am, morally, stuck with them.”49 This goes hand
in hand with Duff ’s idea of wrongfulness as a moral demand from the
community to the individual, although the idea that these demands are
given in moral experience is arguably something for which Duff does not
properly account.
Hegel, however, provides in his Philosophy of Right,50 his main work in
political philosophy, why the notion of recognition is so important to the
constitution of crime and punishment. Recognition is in the core of the
idea of right, reflected mainly on the notion of property, where “[t]he em-
bodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its recognisability by
others.”51 Such recognition is guaranteed by the realization of a contract
that represents the common will of the parties. The idea of wrong appears
in Hegel as a negation of the common, universal will made by a particular
party to the contract.52 The nature of the wrong, then, is to go against
the common will established in the contract. What is important to
realize here—something with which Duff would probably agree—is that
“[w]rong thus presupposes the establishment and existence of some mutu-
ally recognized common will that finds expression in contract”53: without
a contract, without some previous agreement, there is no wrong.
The worst kind of wrong to Hegel is the wrong of transgression, or
crime; it is “characterised by a criminal’s rejection of another will’s capacity
for rights”54; that is, it is an open negation of someone else’s rights.
Punishment comes thus to the fore as a way of asserting the nullity of
crime’s negation of rights, as right “reasserts itself by negating this nega-
tion of itself.”55 Basically, when the criminal betrays the common will, he
creates a law that can only be good for himself, and then punishment re-
turns the criminal’s own law back to him, thus evidencing the wrongful-
ness of his actions and reaffirming the right contained in the common
will. The most relevant point here to a discussion of recognition is precisely
. Id.
. G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ().
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Robert R. Williams, Hegel’s Ethics of Recognition  ().
. Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy  ().
. Hegel, supra note , at .
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to understand that punishment presupposes a common will, a social con-
tract that is grounded on mutual recognition.
This social contract, by its turn, is an essential part of an established
political community. Hegel criticized views of the social contract such as
Hobbes’s, saying that the contract breaks with the state of nature as if
introducing an all-new social order that completely contradicts the old one;
Axel Honneth identifies especially in Hegel’s early work a deeper focus on
intersubjectivity. When Hegel criticizes the idea of a social contract consti-
tuting the basis for the legal person, “Hegel wishes to show that the emer-
gence of the social contract—and, thereby, of legal relations—represents a
practical event that necessarily follows from the initial social situation of the
state of nature itself.”56 In other words, in the very presupposition of a so-
cial contract organizing individual conduct, “theoretical attention must be
shifted to the intersubjective social relations that always already guarantee a
minimal normative consensus in advance”57; Hegel asserts the necessity “to
integrate the obligation of mutual recognition into the state of nature as a
social fact.”58
Instead of individuals receiving a moral demand of fellowship from a
community, Hegel’s critique of the social contract inserts a dialectical
movement in this relation—as fellowship is also what generates individu-
ality. Hegel does not deny that conflict is intrinsic in basic human rela-
tions, but what he challenges is the nature of this conflict. Whereas a
classic interpretation of the state of nature would suggest a conflict of
claims based on “struggles for self-assertion,” the Hegelian reading points
rather to a process in which “individuals learn to see themselves as being
fitted out with intersubjectively accepted rights,” inscribed in a “struggle
for recognition.”59 It happens that the struggle is not merely defined by
the opposing subjects; it also defines them in return. What Honneth
points out is that it is incorrect to see the antagonists in the state of nature
as isolated, egocentric beings, for “the social meaning of the conflict can
only be adequately understood by ascribing to both parties knowledge of
their dependence on the other.”60
. Honneth, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id. at .
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It is precisely this interdependence, evident in Hegel’s work, that would
justify the need to address wrongs in order to preserve the mutual recogni-
tion guaranteed by right. The problem that this paper aims to highlight,
though, is that the justification of punishment comes from the nature of
wrong as a breach of the common will; wrong is taken as a “wilful disregard
for mutual recognition”61 made by a rational being voluntarily breaking a
previous contract in which they were fully recognized. It is imperative to
ask, then, whether this account is coherent with the way in which individ-
uals are recognized in social conditions.
The key to answer this question arguably lies not in Hegel’s work in
political philosophy, but in his account of the development of self-
consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Though systematic accounts
of Hegel’s work tend to consider the Phenomenology as a preliminary work
before his encyclopaedic systematization of themes and concepts,62 it not
only provides the most elaborate account of recognition as part of the
movement of Spirit, but it also examines the aim of the process of recog-
nition and, of particular interest to this paper, instances in which the pro-
cess can deviate from its aim.
A. Recognition and Self-Consciousness
Alexandre Kojève probably makes the most sophisticated account of Hegel’s
development of Spirit through History as a process of recognition, bringing
together some of the elements of Hegel’s earlier works on the topic through
the Marxist elements in his interpretation. It starts with the idea that
“Man is Self-Consciousness”63; what constitutes humanity, human subjec-
tivity, is the fact that man is (or rather has the potential to be) “conscious
of himself, of his human reality and dignity.”64 This essential subjectivism
is implied in the essence of contemporary liberal philosophical conceptions
. Brooks, supra note , at .
. See, e.g., Brooks, id. Dudley Knowles (Hegel and the Philosophy of Right, ),
on the other hand, acknowledges the importance that the development of recognition in
the Phenomenoloy has for Hegel’s political philosophy; even though he claims that in the
end Hegel falls short of his own demands for mutual recognition in the Philosophy of Right
(id. at ); this paper agrees with Knowles on this point, and aims precisely to develop
how punishment in particular falls short of such demands.
. Kojève, supra note , at .
. Id.
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of responsibility and autonomy; what is unique in Hegel, however, is his
argument that recognition underlies self-consciousness.
The development of self-consciousness is for Hegel part of a long process
of awareness, with alternating moments of integration and differentiation be-
tween subject and object. Understanding this genealogy of self-consciousness,
the “origin”65 of subjectivity and the philosophical conditions for its flour-
ishing, then, provides an intrinsic tool to understanding human being in
itself. The dialectics of self-consciousness, which informs this understand-
ing, is essentially the movement between knowing and being or, in Kojève’s
account, between knowledge and desire. Desire always presents itself as a
lack: man desires what he lacks, what he is not, and thus by desiring, man
acknowledges his own limits; and through these limits he sets up the bound-
aries of his own being, he defines himself. Whereas knowledge seems to
bring forth synthesis and integration, desire initially highlights monadic
antagonism and separation.
But “[i]n contrast to the knowledge that keeps man in a passive quietude,
desire dis-quiets him and moves him to action”66; so man is moved to act
upon the world and satisfy his desire, to negate his lack. “Thus, all action is
‘negating,’”67 is transforming the world in pursuit of the satisfaction of
a desire. This mechanics can be seen in simple examples like feeding, in
which the lack of sustenance leads to the destruction (transformation, “real
negation”68) of food for the satisfaction of hunger. Hegel refers to the devel-
oping subject in this particular moment as “life,” and this desire for survival
distinguishes the subject from their surroundings through this process of
active negation, in which “Life in the universal fluid medium, a passive
separating-out of the shapes becomes, just by so doing, a movement of
those shapes or becomes Life as a process.”69 This process is, for Hegel, the
“genus”70 of consciousness and individuality.
Just as life as a process turns a passive knowledge of one’s surroundings
into an active participation in the world (moved by the feeling of lack, de-
sire), consciousness reflects upon the contrast between the world and itself.
It is only through this comparison, through this process, that consciousness
. Id.
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Cf. Norrie, Dialectic and Difference  ().
. Hegel, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
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is able to know anything about itself—that it is able to become self-
consciousness. It is desire—the feeling of lack, of difference—that puts this
shifting of knowledge in motion, and it is precisely the action to satisfy a
desire that transforms the subject’s relations with the world. This whole pro-
cess of interaction shapes not only the subject’s knowledge of the world, but
also their knowledge of themselves.
Thus it is, for example, the desire of self-preservation and proliferation,
and the specific ways in which their satisfaction is possible, that teach the
subject about their animal nature. The main point about recognition,
however, is that to become conscious of their human nature, subjects need
something in the world to reflect such humanity back to them; they need
other human beings. Therein lies the limit of desire and the secret of the
process of self-consciousness: to know itself, it must have itself as an ob-
ject. In other words, a subject can only be aware of their own individuality
if they can compare themselves to another subject. Kojève will say that
“[h]uman Desire must be directed towards another Desire,”71 toward an-
other desiring subject, following Hegel’s claim that “[s]elf-consciousness
achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.”72
Thus “[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact
that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”73
This statement gives the full thrust of Hegel’s critique of the state of
nature; for the subject is only a proper individual through the acknowledge-
ment of kinship with another individual—true individuality exists only
within a social reality. Self-consciousness needs to “come out of itself”74 and
see its own subjectivity reflected in another being; that is what constitutes
and initiates what Hegel calls the “process of Recognition.”75 There is a nec-
essary reciprocity in this movement, as it only works if one subject can rec-
ognize itself in the other. “Action by one side only would be useless because
what is to happen can only be brought about by both”76; the process of self-
consciousness must appear as a middle term through which subjects “recog-
nize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.”77
. Kojève, supra note , at .
. Hegel, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at .
. Id.
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The history of subjectivity, according to this particular narrative, leads
to the conclusion that the essence of human desire is to place man as the
end of desire itself. This qualitatively distinct human desire for individual-
ity (self-consciousness) can only be properly satisfied through recognition.
“All human Desire is a function of the desire for ‘recognition.’”78 Since
such recognition is necessarily intersubjective, it has to be reciprocal. There
is an intrinsic solidarity in this process, for to be an individual—to be
acknowledged and valued as a subject—one needs to belong to a society of
individuals. The mutual recognition implied in the social contract is not
merely engendered by individuals; it shapes individuality as well.
B. Recognition and the Life-and-Death Struggle
There is, however, a problem with recognition. Man needs to be mutually
recognized for his subjectivity to be realized; while he may be aware of his
own subjectivity, this certainty is not yet concrete, because “for an idea to
be a truth, it must reveal an objective reality.”79 And the only situation in
which this objective reality can be achieved is when the subject is equally
recognized by another. Although human individuality can only exist through
recognition of the other’s equally human desires, there still exists the matter
of the satisfaction of such desires. The acknowledgment of another desiring
subject, as Hobbes implied in his Leviathan,80 may simply mean that there
are two people in the world desiring something that may not be enough for
both; the anxiety behind this threat looms ever present in the process of rec-
ognition, which takes the shape of a struggle. So whereas the desire for recog-
nition generates self-consciousness and individuality, the pursuit of this desire
leads to conflict.
The ideal situation is likely one in which human values sustain a mutual
understanding of reality, which can thus be truly understood as a social
reality—or, in Duff ’s terms, a community in which all of its members are
properly and equally recognized. But this community, which in the ab-
stract is a presupposition of every social interaction, can only be concretely
(objectively) realized in the end of a process of awareness and solidarity,
and what is seen throughout history, instead, is a variety of incomplete,
. Kojève, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan  ().
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partial, one-sided forms of recognition. The acknowledgment of a mutual
desire does not necessarily lead to cooperation toward mutual satisfaction;
History usually tells a story in which the opposite is the rule.
So what starts as a “pure” conception of recognition results in a process
in which recognition goes wrong, since it is not (yet) properly grounded in
reciprocity. Hegel’s account of the mythical first encounter between two
subjectivities takes the form of a life-and-death struggle that results from
the competitive quality inherent in opposing claims of subjectivity. But
the satisfaction of recognition necessitates an objective reality, as said be-
fore, and “self-consciousness learns that life is . . . essential to it.”81 When
this happens, the struggle becomes one of domination as one subject (the
lord, the Master) imposes their recognition over another (the bondsman,
the Slave)—“one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.”82 The
lord’s essential nature is “to be for itself,” to be independent, whereas
the bondsman’s nature “is simply to live or to be for another,”83 to live in
submission.
It may seem at first that this unequal recognition is unsatisfactory be-
cause it is unfair that only one side is recognized. Although this may be
true, the full thrust of Hegel’s critique is that, in fact, none of the parts to
the conflict is fully recognized, not even the lord, as “for recognition proper
the moment is lacking, that what the lord does to the other he also does to
himself, and what the bondsman does to himself he should also do to the
other.”84 When the lord is recognized by the bondsman, he is recognized
by someone whose autonomy he does not fully recognize, and so the bonds-
man’s recognition of the lord is also imperfect—“For he can be satisfied
only by recognition from one whom he recognizes as worthy of recognizing
him.”85 To be properly recognized, one needs to properly recognize: that is
the essence of concrete reciprocity.
The mutuality inherent in Hegel’s account of recognition points directly
to a substantially communicative, relational framework. As Honneth points
out in his argument,86 a recognitive social theory should undoubtedly be
. Hegel, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Kojève, supra note , at .
. See the discussion above and see supra notes –.
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communicative. But what Hegel’s and mainly Kojève’s87 dialectics of recog-
nition point out is that the recognition that underlies communication does
not guarantee solidarity, and the process can go wrong. As we saw earlier,
however, punishment requires the preexistence of a common will, of a com-
munity. It is not clear, however, how the process of recognition evolves
from the Master-Slave dialectic to a situation of concrete mutual recogni-
tion. Hegel does not resolve this problem in the Phenomenology, showing in-
stead that this dialectic repeats itself at higher levels of self-consciousness,88
and in his post-phenomenological work he does not address this problem
directly. But this illustration of the process of recognition can arguably
be the key to understand the challenges and paradoxes that punishment
presents to a liberal society.
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel examines the theory of punishment
from a perspective of abstract right; his theory is therefore still limited to
an abstract, relatively subjective level, and Hegel himself points to the fact
that “acts of punishment at the level of abstract right are acts of revenge, as
there is no designated penal power.”89 He states that punishment in the
abstract is in fact equated to crime as, without a common will to legiti-
mate it, the right that punishment strives to preserve is as contingent as
the right the criminal evokes in their actions. In the abstract, both crime
and punishment display the same disregard for the other party’s claim to
right. That is why Hegel will say although there are many considerations
to be taken in a theory of punishment, the essential point is to examine
the fact that “all these considerations presuppose as their foundation the
fact that punishment is inherently and actually just.”90
There is a gap between this abstract account of punishment and what
systematic readers of the Philosophy of Right91 will consider Hegel’s con-
crete account of punishment when he considers the administration of jus-
tice. There the focus of punishment changes from a direct relation with
the wrongfulness of the criminal’s deed to a relation with the state and
condition of civil society. Indeed, Hegel points to the fact that the stability
. As briefly discussed above, Kojève’s account of the dialectics of recognition radical-
izes Hegel’s account with a focus on a material dialectic through the use of a Marxist
perspective. For more, see Kojève, supra note , at –.
. Williams, supra note , at .
. Brooks, supra note , at .
. Hegel, supra note , at .
. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note .
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or sense of security of a society can directly influence how punishments
are envisaged,92 and this represents a shift in what is considered to be a
mainly retributive theory of punishment.93 Although it seems that the ad-
ministration of justice retains a retributive core, it is certain that the “penal
code, then, is primarily the child of its age and the state of civil society at
the time.”94
But what if the state of civil society in particular circumstances or in a
particular context is not in a state of mutual recognition? If it is acknowl-
edged that structural problems hinder the presumption of a common will,
the justification of punishment as a communicative endeavor is not very
far from the Master’s illusion that the submission of the Slave will grant
him the recognition he desires; it is a situation of false consciousness.
Concrete recognition would require the conditions for a mutual satisfac-
tion of human desires: structural problems of injustice and inequality would
need to be resolved for it to occur. This structural disharmony generates dis-
sonance in ethical and moral expectations. Recognition, taken seriously as
the core of genuinely reciprocal communication, raises important questions
for thinking about an account of punishment as communication.
I I I . PUN ISHMENT AND THE LIM ITS OF COMMUNITY
We have now considered Duff ’s account of punishment as communica-
tion, noting his underlying commitment to recognition, and examined in
some depth the account of recognition provided by an examination of
Hegel’s work. The possibility that recognition can go wrong appeared as
problems in the recognition process that are related to questions of social
structure and justice, and that hinder the justification of punishment. This
. Hegel, supra note , at .
. Other commentators such as Dudley Knowles (supra note ) argue that it is pre-
cisely this instance of administration of justice that will give coherence and substance to
Hegel’s theory of punishment, since it brings together the restoration of right and the par-
ticular right of the criminal. But the focus to the subjective part still is the fact “that the
criminal must recognize that his punishment is legitimate in so far as it procures the restora-
tion of right” (id. at ). Such restoration is not only dependent on social mechanisms that
“demonstrate to all, honest and criminal citizens alike, the nature of their rights” (id. at
), but also depend on the common will previously mentioned.
. Hegel, supra note , at .
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third section now returns to Duff ’s normative theory of punishment in
light of this discussion of recognition.
Responsibility, autonomy, and communication can all be tied together
and examined through a perspective of recognition. Duff ’s claim that we
are owed a communicative engagement on the part of the legal system re-
fers to the image of the abstract individual that the legal framework strives
to uphold, and is in league with the ideal of mutual recognition. What
Duff fails to recognize, however, is that these theoretical aspirations are
not in harmony with the practices and categories of punishment. Punish-
ment, even if conceptualized as forceful moral communication, carries
within itself a certain logic of violence and domination; the punisher is
only concerned with communication as a way to make the deviant conform
to preestablished rules, and as thus cannot fully recognize their agency. There
is a paradox within the system, between the paradigm it uses to justify its
practices and the function and consequences of the practices themselves.
Recognition seems to indicate that force goes against reciprocal communica-
tion, and there is no punishment without force.95
A theory of recognition, on the other hand, shows that socialization oc-
curs in different levels or dimensions. First, a critical theory of recognition
reformulates the nature of the social contract, by placing individuality as
dependent on sociability; individuals do not gather to form a society, they
are generated through social coexistence. Second, although sociability is
inherent to human beings, the acknowledgement of a multitude of desires
leads to a struggle for recognition where there is a clash of competing
claims and expectations. And, third, although the struggle for recognition
generates situations of violence and domination, the inherent solidarity in
human sociability implies that the desire for recognition can only be fully
satisfied in a condition of mutual recognition, where one subject is fully
recognized by someone they fully recognize. It is quite understandable
that a liberal legal order would seek to realize mutual recognition, but the
very existence of the categories of crime and punishment suggests that the
struggle for recognition still persists, since the recognition that such cate-
gories provide can at best be partial and unequal.
. Andrew von Hirsch has a similar critique of Duff ’s theory in relation to this point,
although not from a perspective of recognition. See A. von Hirsch, Proportionate Sen-
tences: A Desert Perspective, in Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy 
(A. von Hirsch, A. Ashworth, & J. Roberts eds., d ed. ).
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Duff ’s communicative logic seems to begin from the end; that is, it
seems to start with the assumption that a liberal political community is in
a situation of mutual recognition, and that deviance drags the individual
back to the struggle. Instead, what seems to be the case is that the legal
framework embodies values and expectations that are in many cases still
struggling to be fully recognized, and it finds in the deviant’s values a
competing claim. But as the parable of the Master and the Slave shows us,
forceful communication not only fails to recognize the criminal, but it also
does the system itself a disservice. Although there is certainly some logic
behind the activity of punishment—and it seems to use the language of
autonomy and recognition, which can be a positive thing—such logic ne-
cessitates rather than assures solidarity and mutual recognition.
The perspective that individuality is socially generated—and precisely
because of that, it is not generated equally in different circumstances—
elucidates that the struggle for recognition occurs between differentiated
subjectivities, which due to their distinct social contexts do not share a
common social, political, or legal understanding. The legal framework and
its abstract individual, along with its image of an abstract (concretized) po-
litical community, fail to account for this social complexity. The legal
framework assumes that every individual is an integral part of this political
community—that is, that the struggle for recognition as a social reality is
basically over—and, by assuming that every individual shares the values it
represents, punishment does seem to be a legitimate endeavor.96 The only
ripple in this otherwise placid lake of theory, however, is that if every in-
dividual is fully recognized within a set of values that they fully understand
and accept, then they would not desire anything outside of the system,
and then punishment would not be necessary—or would be reserved to
a select group of unenlightened few. The very fact that punishment exists
and that society (even if reluctantly) accepts its categories and practices
suggests that the community to which the legal system aspires is not yet
fully realized.
. This seems also to be the case in Hegel’s conception of the state, although interpre-
tations of Hegelian scholarship would also suggest that this is Hegel’s description of how
the state sees itself rather than a normative description of what would happen in an ideal
society (see, e.g., Robert Fine, Political Investigations ()). Even so, Hegel still finds
many problems in modern society, such as the situation of endemic poverty where it
“immediately takes the form of a wrong done to one class by another” (supra note , at
–) and “there is a consequent loss of the sense of right and wrong” (id. at ).
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Instead, what transpires is that the offender has a desire that the legal
system is presently unable or unwilling to recognize. Although it is very
likely that the offender’s desire is being expressed in an inappropriate way
(it is in itself at best an example of forceful moral communication), the pun-
isher’s answer seems to suffer from the same vice. The system feels threat-
ened, and so it threatens (or retaliates) in return. One way to break out
of this vicious circle would be to concretely communicate the recognition
of the offender’s humanity, of their value, and this can arguably only be
done through a real dialogue that properly addresses the social context in
which the offender’s actions are situated. But this seems highly incompatible
with the way in which punishment operates. The normative assumption of
the deviant’s expectations as wrongful (the fairness of which must be exam-
ined, but such examination is beyond the scope of this paper) is unable to
provide a reciprocal engagement; it represses the existence of the struggle for
recognition. This is indeed an issue for how contemporary criminal justice
systems are envisioned and theorized: by preestablishing the wrongfulness of
some course of action and only then pursuing the relationality between in-
dividual and community, theories of punishment seem to invert the logic
of recognition, thus rendering the proposed communication inexistent at
worst, insufficient—because it is one-sided—at best.
This is of course not to say that replacing the categories of punishment
is something simple or even presently possible; neither it is to say that the
fact that categories of punishment contradictorily reflect aspirations for
mutual recognition is something only to be regretted. The main point is
to address the fact that, if a theory of punishment is to be grounded upon
notions of responsibility that strive to respect concrete individuality, that
theory needs to be aware that communication is a project, and proper rec-
ognition still an aspiration. Otherwise, its categories start to challenge and
contradict themselves, and the system finds itself working against the same
principles it allegedly preserves. Duff ’s discussion about the terrorist pro-
vides an example of this paradox.
A. Terrorism and Recognition
Duff concludes his article about punishment as secular penance with a ques-
tion concerning what he calls “the limits of community.” He starts by say-
ing that punishment, as an essentially inclusionary activity, “is supposed to
constitute a mode of moral reparation through which [the offender] is to
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be reconciled with those he has wronged—through which the bonds of
political community are to be repaired and strengthened.”97 This leads to
a question of “whether there are any crimes whose character is such that we
need not, or should not, or cannot maintain such community with the of-
fender”98—that is, crimes that negate this inclusionary character of punish-
ment but do so in a “legitimate, appropriate or even necessary”99 way, since
the very nature of the crime denies the possibility of community. Duff
presses the issue by suggesting that many kinds of punishment reflect pre-
cisely that assumption, such as capital punishment or life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, since they do not leave open any real possi-
bility of reintegration of the offender with the community. He rejects a gen-
eral application of such categories of punishment under the limits of his
theory, for “[w]ith at least the vast majority of crimes and criminals, we
should continue to see and to treat them as fellow members of the norma-
tive community who must be punished, but whose moral standing as mem-
bers is not to be denied or qualified.”100 But then he presents the possibility
of exceptions to the rule, in which some extreme forms of wrongful conduct
might be enough to give rise to an unrepairable breach of community.
Duff argues that three particular scenarios exemplify the reasoning behind
this compromise. The first inquires about some crimes being so terrible in
themselves that they preclude any possibility of the restoration or continua-
tion of community between criminal and society; the second corresponds to
criminal careers, that is, the “persistent commission of dangerous and violent
crimes, which display in the end such an incorrigible rejection of the com-
munity’s central values” as to lead to the aforementioned breach; and the
third case finally refers to terrorist attacks “such as, most terribly, those com-
mitted on New York and Washington in September .”101
Considering whether or not any of these examples would admit the im-
possibility of communicative punishment, Duff claims he is fairly confident
that the first case should be answered with a negative as “no single deed,
however terrible, should put a person beyond civic redemption.”102 Duff is
slightly more hesitant when it comes to the second case, as the insistence on
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Id. at –.
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
TERRORISM, PUNISHMENT, AND RECOGNIT ION | 367
This content downloaded from 138.40.68.115 on Wed, 20 Nov 2013 07:08:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
wrongful behavior could be significantly damaging to the bond between
offender and community, and to deny the possibility of measures such as
permanent detention in these cases would be “to believe that the bonds of
community, and the status of citizenship, are unconditional and absolute—
that nothing, not even a person’s own persistent demonstration that he
utterly rejects the demands of citizenship and community, can destroy
them.”103 Duff seems to be reluctant to accept this possibility, which he ap-
proximates to a religious ideal unsuitable for the modern state. A recognitive
perspective, however, would question first of all whether the aforemen-
tioned rejection is a consequence of the criminal’s actions, or whether it is
inherent in the social context and consequently in the law’s interpretation
of them.
As regards the matter of the terrorist attack, Duff complicates the prob-
lem by introducing a further discussion on law and punishment. He con-
siders the hypothesis of a terrorist attack in which there is a good idea of
who the perpetrators are, then asks whether, assuming those probable sus-
pects are actually under pursuit, we should “treat this as an attempt to ar-
rest suspected criminals . . . or as a defensive war to prosecute against an
alien enemy.”104 He reflects that, although moral constraints have to be
acknowledged in regard to the treatment of these suspects, “the aims even
of a just war and the moral constraints on its conduct clearly differ from
the aims and constraints of a system of communicative punishments. War
aims not at reconciliation with the enemy . . . but at victory.”105 He fur-
ther claims that the terrorists themselves probably see their own activities
under the same light, as a war against an enemy regime or a state. But
then he asks, “should we take this view?”106
In the article presently under discussion, Duff says he doesn’t have a clear
answer to this problem; indeed, he says that “any normatively plausible ac-
count of the situation would need to be much more complex and nuanced
than such a simple ‘either/or’ allows”107; he further argues that “we should
surely be very reluctant to abandon the moral constraints that belong with
the enterprise of criminal justice, in favor of the rather weaker constraints
that apply to the conduct of war,” and that “we should also be very reluctant
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. Id. at .
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to exclude the perpetrator from any prospect of community with us.”108
Two years later, however, in his article “Notes on Punishment and Terror-
ism,”109Duff addresses the same problem again and offers a rather different
answer. As said before, the main theme of this article is the question of
whether we should see the terrorist as a criminal (subject to the criminal law
of the state), as an enemy combatant (protected by international humanitar-
ian law), or as an “unlawful combatant” (that is, as someone with “no such
moral claims on our respect or concern and whom we may treat in any way
that seems necessary to ensure our own safety and to ‘defeat terrorism’”110).
Duff says, first of all, that to see terrorists as criminals “is to see them as
moral agents with whom we must still seek to communicate,” and under
such view they would be “entitled to the same protections as any citi-
zen.”111 “However,” he continues, “we might plausibly feel that especially
with the more serious kinds of international (as distinct from domestic) ter-
rorism, we are faced by something that is more like war than crime.”112
The main argument Duff uses in support of his view113 is that, given
the extreme nature of the “wrongfulness” involved in certain terrorist
activities, the interaction between a community114 and the perpetrators
would be better interpreted as a situation of war than one of punishment;
. Id.
. Duff, supra note .
. Id. at . Duff is here clearly referring to the approach purported by the U.S. govern-
ment for many years, reflected in regimes of detention without trial such as Guantanamo Bay.
The United Kingdom had a similar approach in Belmarsh prison with the Anti-terrorism,
Crime and Security Act  until the Prevention of Terrorism Act  repealed the provi-
sions for detention without trial.
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Id.
. It should be noted here that Duff does not assert that he supports the view that the
terrorist should be treated as an enemy combatant; instead, his claim is “that the rules of war
mark the minimal constraints that we must respect in our dealings with other human beings,
whatever they have done” (id. at ). But it can be argued that, by saying this, Duff is accept-
ing the possibility of denying access to the system of punishment to a terrorist.
. Here Duff is thinking specifically of a community of citizens within a state, but it
can be argued that his theory of punishment involves values that are not specifically directed
toward any such limitation, but instead reflect a widespread ideology within Western legal and
philosophical thought. His own argument, on the other hand, has strong claims to rational—
and thus universal—validity, and by transferring his reasoning to the discussion of inter-
national terrorism and matters such as war, Duff is allowing his reasoning to go beyond the
normative limits of a particular state.
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and he believes such is an important distinction because “[i]t is true that
warfare does not aim—as punishment should aim—at moral communica-
tion with the enemy.”115 What seems to be confusing in this situation is
what conception of communication Duff is referring to. If communica-
tion would be simply some attempt to reach out to the other in order to
convince or persuade them (that is, forceful moral communication), then
certainly the terrorist is trying to communicate something—even if it is an
extreme and fundamentalist message. Looking at legislation in the United
Kingdom, the definition of terrorism in the Terrorist Act  states that
it includes an intent “to influence the government or an international gov-
ernmental organization or to intimidate the public or a section of the pub-
lic,” and must have “the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial
or ideological cause,”116 which necessarily implies that there is some clear
message being transmitted through an act of terrorism.
Within a normative framework that takes recognition (and communi-
cation) seriously, the possibility that the specific attitudes of the terrorist
may place them outside of any notion of community go against the very
principles of responsibility and autonomy upheld by the tenets of liberal
law that Duff is trying to espouse. This is so not because a sense of com-
munity would be taken as absolute, but because the actions of the terrorist
should not be interpreted as directed completely against the community,
but rather as an expression of the same desire for recognition that is taken
as a presupposition of it. To say that war does not aim at moral commu-
nication with the enemy would be an argument against the legitimacy of
war, rather than against the possibility of punishment.117 Duff ’s discus-
sion on the limits of community rather hints at the situations in which the
justificatory logic of punishment exposes its own limitations.
Terrorism challenges liberal conceptions of punishment precisely because
its global and political nature expose the contradictions in the justification
. Duff, supra note , at .
. Terrorism Act , § (), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga//
/part/I.
. This is particularly relevant if we consider that war is politics by other means, and
that politics can also be seen as the continuation of war by other means. See Michel
Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (). Also, for more on the dichotomy between
crime and war, see Lucia Zedner, Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflections from
Criminal Justice,  J. L. & Soc’y (); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of
War,  Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y ().
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of punishment. The book Philosophy in a Time of Terror118 presents inter-
views with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida about the attacks of
September , , shortly after they occurred. Habermas provides a clear
explanation of how terrorism in the twenty-first century, inflamed by funda-
mentalism, can be better understood as the result of frustrated claims of com-
munities that are not adapted to the modern secular framework of Western
society.119 Furthermore, Western society in itself contains “a structural vio-
lence that, to a certain degree, we have gotten used to, that is, unconscionable
social inequality, degrading discrimination, pauperization, and marginaliza-
tion”120; this structural violence is deeply related to a distortion in communi-
cation that arises from conflicting expectations, and if left unchecked, one
feeds into the other until communication is no longer possible.121This partic-
ular view arguably “explains why attempts at understanding have a chance only
under symmetrical conditions of mutual perspective-taking”122 where com-
munication would be free from distortion. And although Habermas admits
that “communication is always ambiguous, suspect of latent violence,”123 he
advises that seeing communication embedded purely in violence and letting
force respond to force misses the point, “that the critical power to put a stop
to violence, without reproducing it in circles of new violence, can only dwell
in the telos of mutual understanding.”124 This is a call to continued recogni-
tion and communication in structural conditions where all parties share some
responsibility for what occurs; legal categories of guilt and wrongfulness go
against this logic ofmutual understanding, which is something that a commu-
nicative theory of punishment seems to ignore.
Activities that are taken as emblematic of terrorism are never to be en-
dorsed or ignored; on the contrary, it is necessary that they be engaged and
dealt with. But to properly confront the threat of extreme violence in a way
that seriously considers the values of human dignity and individual auton-
omy, the legal system must either do better than to ignore the social context
in which such violence occurs or abandon its pretentions to be communica-
tive and find its justification somewhere else. Thus Derrida says, “One can
. Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror ().
. Jürgen Habermas, in Borradori, id. at –.
. Id. at .
. Id.
. Id. at .
. Id. at .
. Id.
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thus condemn unconditionally . . . the attack of September  without hav-
ing to ignore the real or alleged conditions that made it possible.”125 A crit-
ical account of September  is an example of how it is possible to try and
understand terrorism from beyond this “lexicon of violence” that is “legiti-
mated by the prevailing system.”126 International terrorism127 seems to act
rather within the same framework as the law, as “all terrorism presents itself
as a response in a situation that continues to escalate”128—and in this glob-
alized situation of violence, “dialogue (at once verbal and peaceful) is not
taking place. Recourse to the worst violence is thus often presented as the
only ‘response’ to a ‘deaf ear.’”129 This seems to be the expressed justifica-
tion given by terrorists for their actions; surely a normative system commit-
ted to communication and recognition should do better.
Even if the terrorist is subjectively claiming to act against the “Western
political community” (a claim inherent to the discourse attributed to
jihadist violence), they are objectively acting in community, against (aspects
of ) a community that frustrates recognition. The means they choose to re-
claim recognition are surely mistaken and lead to terrible consequences, and
something indeed ought to be done about it; but the same mistake could be
attributed to any overzealous imposition of a moral framework (any forceful
moral communication or, even worse, a refusal to communicate) in re-
sponse to their activities. The way out of such an orientation can only be
grasped within a much larger perspective than would be permitted by an
isolated legal framework. But if heed is to be paid to a serious account of
the values behind the respect for the individual, it should at the very least
be required that the law acknowledge its limitations.
CONCLUS ION
This paper has interacted with Duff ’s communicative theory of punish-
ment and its implications to the treatment of terrorism by the criminal law
in an attempt to illustrate the difficulties in finding a liberal justification
. Jacques Derrida, in Borradori, supra note , at .
. Id. at .
. Although a similar critique could be elaborated in regard to all actions that are usu-
ally associated with terrorism, this paper focuses on the nature of international terrorism
endemic to the twenty-first century. For more on that, see, e.g., Bruce Hoffman, Inside
Terrorism ().
. Derrida, in Borradori, supra note , at .
. Id. at –.
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for punishment that can account for the normative implications highlighted
by structural inequality and social injustice. Although it may be true that pun-
ishment has a place and a function in society, this function should not be mis-
taken with a normative justification that implies that violence and coercion
can preserve or develop a framework of communication and recognition.
Duff ’s contribution of engaging with difficult challenges and pushing forward
the need to think normatively about punishment is welcome and necessary,
but perhaps there is a need to acknowledge how this normative perception
depends upon a larger framework that includes many other elements, which
punishment is not only unable to provide, but also liable to harm.
Criminalization is one of the most important debates occurring in cur-
rent criminal legal theory,130 and such debate relies heavily on an exami-
nation of what the criminal law should be, in order to determine what
should or should not be criminalized. This paper embraces an examina-
tion of the law’s normative limits, hopefully suggesting a reflection on
what it means to punish, and why there seems to be a social need for the
institution. Such reflection invites the view that a shift in perspective—
from punishment to recognition—is necessary if any of the wrongs iden-
tified in society are to be concretely dealt with. Then, maybe a properly
communicative conception of responsibility can begin to unfurl, and
problems such as terrorism will be better understood by the criminal law.
The intention here is not to advocate for the abolition of punishment, nor
to denigrate the importance of its current moral constraints. It is rather to
deal with the many tensions and contradictions that exist within the institu-
tion by critically analyzing its limitations and questioning its justification.
Duff ’s call for communication and recognition is to be welcomed, but these
concepts cannot have punishment as an end—on the contrary, they ought to
aspire to an end to punishment. If the communitarian conditions to which
Duff aspires are somehow realized, punishment is not vindicated—it begins
to lose its purpose. If the institution of punishment still has a function in so-
ciety, it should be clear that this function is in conflict with the higher liberal
aspirations, and the criminal law’s main role in a liberal society like the one
Duff envisions, striving for autonomy and recognition, should be to eradicate
its own presuppositions: to make itself unnecessary. A liberal system of pun-
ishment should ideally hope for its own demise. Although these reflections
remain essentially theoretical and normative, after further development they
. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, L. Farmer, S.E. Marshall, M. Renzo, & V. Tadros, The
Boundaries of the Criminal Law ().
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could easily point to more practical suggestions in regard to the criminal law,
both in its formal elements and in relation to a larger framework of the
administration of justice.
The contemporary legal notion of terrorism is problematic, if one seri-
ously considers the claims grounding the principle of individual autonomy.
The problem may be mainly identified as coming from the tensions that
exist in the interaction between a concrete, dialectical subject and an ab-
stract, undialectical normative framework, represented in this particular case
by the system of criminal law. If recognition is to be taken as expressive of
the tenets behind the principles sustained by legal discourse, then the indi-
vidual is formed precisely by this interaction of conflicting expectations in
society, which are a consequence of their (human) desire to be recognized
as a subject. Although the law acknowledges such desires in principle, the
way in which it attempts to manage social expectations ends up repressing
the complexity and diversity found in concrete social conditions, by delim-
iting what comes to be standard and acceptable behavior. All that falls out-
side of this framework is taken to be deviant and wrongful, and seen to
deny the possibility of community that the law at its core strives to uphold.
But instead of recognizing this paradox, normative legal theory seems to
repress it in its attempts to fully overcome it without shifting its paradigm,
focusing on the need for punishment expressed in issues of security or
control.131 As Hegel suggests, the lord’s partial recognition of the bondsman
is reflected back into himself, and punishment and terrorism, radically differ-
ent though they may be in many respects, are both heir to and perpetuators of
this vicious circle of structural violence and distorted communication.
Instead, the theory of recognition sketched here aims to suggest that the
community ideally expressed by legal principles relies on the existence and de-
velopment of mutual understanding; and its curtailing seems an affront to the
very concepts that justify the legal order in the first place. This tension be-
tween mutual recognition and one-sided communication poses a paradox for
the legal system, the answer of which is beyond the scope of the reflections
allowed within this paper, but any normative theory of punishment that aims
at advocating a need for communication and recognition has in the very least
to acknowledge it. Only then can the possibility of dealing with the real prob-
lems found in seeking justice through punishment come to the fore.
. For examinations of this contemporary tendency, see Zedner, supra note , or
mainly David Garland, The Culture of Control ().
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